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17 / Catastrophic Climate 
Change 
DAVID A. WIRTH 
For the past several years scientists have issued ominous warnings 
about the future of the earth's climate. Emissions of natural and synthetic 
gases are increasing the heat-trapping capacity of the atmosphere through a 
phenomenon known as the greenhouse effect. Predictions of dramatic global 
change arising from the continued dumping of industrial byproducts into 
the atmosphere and forest loss of massive scale can no longer be ignored. 
Compelling scientific evidence and the projections of computer models now 
strongly suggest that world climate patterns, previously regarded as reliably 
stable, could be thrust into a state of turmoil. 
The projected effects of this worldwide climatic disruption dwarf many 
of the environmental problems of the past and augur political, economic, 
and social disturbances on an enormous scale. Global warming could have 
catastrophic consequences for the habitability and productivity of the whole 
planet. The accompanying strain and upheaval on the international scene in 
turn could have serious foreign policy consequences for all countries. 
Broad scientific agreement exists on the underlying theory of climate 
change, although the timing and magnitude of the effects of greenhouse 
warming remain subjects of considerable debate. Some of these, such as a 
rise in the sea level, have been established with greater certainty than others. 
Nonetheless, the range of consequences is sufficiently clear and the magni-
tude of the resources at stake so enormous that policy action is required 
sooner rather than later. Once a crisis has been reached, it will be too late to 
act. 
The international political and legal system, despite some promising 
recent progress on global environmental issues, such as stratospheric ozone 
depletion, remains ill equipped to offer a solution that will assure the integ-
rity of the earth's climate. Although the greenhouse theory of warming has 
been accepted for about a century, policymakers have only recently become 
aware of its significance for the global environment. The international com-
munity cannot afford to continue to delay elevating the greenhouse effect to 
the top of the foreign policy agenda. Arresting the impending climate insta-
bility will require a concerted international agenda and a reorientation of 
energy and development priorities in virtually all countries of the world. 
It is a violation of the law to reproduce this selection by any means whatsoever without the 
wrinen permission of the copyright holder. 
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Heading this agenda for action should be a global multilateral agreement 
that, at a minimum, sets strict, binding targets for global emissions of car-
bon dioxide. 
CAUSES OF GREENHOUSE WARMING 
Human activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels, since the Industrial 
Revolution have dramatically altered the composition of the global atmo-
sphere. A number of gases, emitted in small but significant amounts, absorb 
infrared radiation reflected from the surface of the earth. As the concentra-
tions of these heat-absorbing gases increase, average global temperatures 
will rise. 
Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) are the single largest cause of elevated 
terrestrial temperatures from the greenhouse effect, accounting for approxi-
mately one-half of the problem. Concentrations of CO2 in the range of 280 
parts per million (ppm), together with water vapor in the atmosphere, estab-
lished the preindustrial equilibrium temperature of the planet. Since the 
middle of the nineteenth century, atmospheric CO2 levels have increased by 
about 25 percent to approximately 350 ppm and are continuing to rise by 
approximately .4 percent per year (see Figure 17.1).1 Elevated CO2 concentra-
tions result primarily from the intensified burning of fossil fuels-coal, oil, 
and natural gas-which liberates the chemical in varying amounts. Coal 
burning releases the most CO2, while the combustion of quantities of natural 
gas and oil needed to produce the same amount of energy results in only 
about 56 percent and 78 percent as much CO2, respectively.2 
The world's forests are vast storehouses or "sinks" for carbon. World-
wide loss of forest cover, by releasing this vast stockpile of carbon into the 
atmosphere as CO2, aggravates the greenhouse problem. Deforestation in 
Third World countries is particularly severe, with the destruction of tropical 
forests in developing countries like Brazil and Indonesia exceeding 40 to 50 
million acres annually from activities such as burning, logging, and conver-
sion to agricultural and pasture land.3 Indeed, the release of CO2 into the 
atmosphere as a result of deforestation worldwide amounts to about 2.8 
billion metric tons annually. 4 As temperature rises, the rate of plant respira-
tion and decay also increases, releasing more carbon dioxide and methane, 
respectively. There is great concern that these so-called feedbacks will fur-
ther accelerate and exacerbate the effects of climate warming.5 
Concentrations of a second important greenhouse gas, nitrous oxide 
(N20), have also been rising, probably because of heavier fossil fuel use, 
greater agricultural activity, and other ecological disturbances. Average 
global atmospheric levels of N20 are approximately 310 parts per billion 
(ppb) and are increasing at an annual rate of .25 percent. 6 Both CO2 and 
N20, unlike some conventional pollutants, are very stable compounds. CO2 
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Figure 17.1 / Carbon Dioxide Concentrations since Preindustrial Times 
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remains in the upper atmosphere for decades after its release and N20 for 
considerably more than a century. 7 Consequently, without major reductions 
in emissions of these gases with long atmospheric lifetimes, their concentra-
tions will continue to grow. 
A group of volatile chemicals known as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) is 
believed to be currently responsible for about 17 percent of the global 
warming trend during the period from 1980 to 1990. 8 These chemicals, 
unlike CO2, are strictly synthetic and are not known in nature. After their 
use as refrigerants, propellants, solvents, and thermal insulators, they are 
often released to the atmosphere. A related class of bromine-containing 
chemicals called halons is found in fire-extinguishing systems. Average 
global atmospheric concentrations of CFC-11 and CFC-12, two of the most 
commercially important chlorofluorocarbons, are approximately .28 ppb 
and .48 ppb, respectively. 9 Atmospheric concentrations of CFC-11 and 
CFC-12 are growing at a rate of approximately 4 percent annually as a 
result of increased world production in recent years. 10 
Although their concentrations are small relative to that of CO2, molecule 
for molecule CFCs are up to 12,000 times more potent in absorbing infrared 
radiation. 11 After release, CFCs and halons reside in the atmosphere for 
close to a century, or sometimes more, because of their great chemical 
stability at low altitudes. Consequently, an immediate 70 to 85 percent 
.... 
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Figure 17.2 / Anthropogenic Sources of Greenhouse Gases* 
Activities Contributing to Global Warming 
* Estimated values based on average values found in literature. 
Source: The Environmental Protection Agency. 
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reduction in emissions of CFC-11 and CFC-12, for example, would be 
necessary merely to stabilize their atmospheric concentrations. 12 With their 
long atmospheric lifetimes, CFCs and halons eventually reach the upper 
atmosphere. There they are the principal culprits in the worldwide loss of 
the protective stratospheric ozone layer, a global environmental problem 
distinct from, although related to, the greenhouse effect. Loss of strato-
spheric ozone, which shields life on earth from harmful levels of ultraviolet 
solar radiation, can increase the risk of skin cancer and cataracts and under-
mine the productivity of terrestrial flora and aquatic ecosystems. 
Methane (CH4), the principal component of natural gas, is another sig-
nificant climate-modifying chemical. It has an atmospheric residence of 
about ten years. 13 Average global concentrations of methane are approxi-
mately 1. 7 ppm and are increasing by about 1 percent per year, the highest 
rate of any naturally occurring greenhouse gas, for reasons that are not now 
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Figure 17.3 / Annual Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions, by World Regions (1950-1981) 
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clear. 14 Animal husbandry and rice cultivation have been identified as major 
sources of increased methane emissions. Ruminant livestock emit methane 
from digestive processes, while flooded rice paddies generate methane from 
the anaerobic decomposition of organic matter. Coal mining, which releases 
methane from coal seams, and landfills, which produce methane from the 
anaerobic decomposition of garbage, are also significant sources, with a 
large potential for rapid growth in the future. 
Low-level ozone is another greenhouse gas. Although ozone in the strato-
sphere is beneficial, this highly unstable chemical is the leading component 
of photochemical smog pollution at the earth's surface (see Figure 17.2). 
While greenhouse gases are dispersed relatively quickly throughout the 
global atmosphere after release, industrial emissions of these heat-absorbing 
chemicals are highly concentrated in the developed world (see Figure 17.3). 
In 1986, 23 percent of total global fossil-fuel-related CO2 emissions of more 
than 20.4 billion metric tons originated in the United States-the single 
largest emitting country and one of the highest per capita contributors 
among industrial countries to the greenhouse problem. The second biggest 
contribution came from the Soviet Union, with 18 percent of total industrial 
CO2 emissions. Western Europe emitted 14 percent of this total, Japan 5 
percent, and the People's Republic of China 10 percent. Other developing 
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countries together accounted for about 20 percent of total industrial CO2 
emissions. 15 
Emissions of CFCs are likewise strongly skewed. In 1986, use of these 
chemicals in the United States accounted for roughly 26 percent of total 
global atmospheric releases of approximately 770,000 metric tons. The 
Soviet Union was responsible for about 13 percent, the remainder of Europe 
36 percent, and industrialized Asian countries 8 percent. The entire develop-
ing world accounted for no more than 13 percent of the global total-
approximately half the contribution of the United States alone. 16 
CONSEQUENCES OF GREENHOUSE 
WARMING 
For some time, an international scientific consensus has been coalescing 
around the view that the accumulation in the atmosphere of CO2, N20, 
CFCs, methane, and low-level ozone could have sweeping and far-reaching 
effects on the earth's climate. For instance, in June 1990 the science working 
group of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change-the interna-
tional body endorsed by the United States and other countries to review the 
science of global warming-made the following categorical assertion: 
"We are certain of the following: ... emissions resulting from human activities 
are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse 
gases: carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous oxide. 
These increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in addi-
tional warming of the Earth's surface." 17 
By as early as the year 2030, the heat-retaining capacity of the atmosphere 
may have increased by an amount equivalent to doubling preindustrial con-
centrations of CO2• Within the next century, average global temperatures may 
have risen by as much as 5° to l0°F compared with preindustrial times. 18 The 
absolute magnitude of these temperatures, as well as the rapidity of tempera-
ture change, will exceed any previously experienced in human history. 
The effects of a greenhouse-driven climate disruption will be character-
ized with complete certainty only after significant damage has already oc-
curred. However, among the most dramatic effects likely to ensue from 
greenhouse warming is an unprecedented rise in sea level resulting from 
thermal expansion of the oceans and melting of glaciers and polar ice. Over 
the past century the average global sea level has increased less than six 
inches. By contrast, by the middle of the next century sea-level rise will have 
accelerated considerably, producing a total increase of up to 1 to 7 feet by 
2075, depending on the degree of global warming that occurs. 19 
The impact of sea-level rise in the United States is likely to be severe. 
The anticipated increase in the elevation of the oceans could permanenth· 
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inundate low-lying coastal plains, accelerate the erosion of shorelines and 
beaches, increase the salinity of drinking water aquifers and biologically 
sensitive estuaries, and increase the susceptibility of coastal properties to 
storm damage. An increase of five to seven feet in sea level would submerge 
30 to 80 percent of America's coastal wetlands, which are crucial to the 
productivity of commercially important fisheries. 20 Extensive existing 
coastal development may prevent the widespread formation of new wet-
lands. Even in undeveloped coastal areas, the rapidity of the predicted sea-
level rise will mean that existing wetlands would be lost faster than new 
ones can be created. 
The increase in elevation of the oceans will also seriously affect the 
approximately 50 percent of the earth's population that inhabits coastal 
regions. Entire countries, such as the Maldives, could disappear. A rise in sea 
level of only three feet could flood an area of the Nile Delta that constitutes 
12 to 15 percent of Egypt's arable land, produces a similar portion of the 
Egyptian annual Gross National Product (GNP), and is home to a compara-
ble percentage of the country's more than 50 million people.21 In Bangla-
desh, a three-foot rise would inundate 11.5 percent of the country's land 
area, displace 9 percent of the more than 110 million people in this densely 
populated country, and threaten 8 percent of the annual GNP.22 
The range of uncertainties associated with local climatic changes is sub-
stantially larger than for global averages. The dramatic anticipated increases 
in global temperature are virtually certain to cause a wide variety of modifi-
cations in regional climates. In middle latitudes, where the continental 
United States lies, summertime temperature increases are expected to exceed 
the global average by 30 to 50 percent.23 Forests, many of them economi-
cally productive, could begin to die off as early as the year 2000 if they prove 
unable to adjust to rapidly shifting climatic zones.24 Regions of agricultural 
productivity could shift at the expense of the American Midwest, which 
currently has some of the most fertile soils in the world. A warming of only 
3.6°F could decrease wheat and cereal yields by 3 to 17 percent.25 Computer 
models, such as those developed at Princeton University's Geophysical Fluid 
Dynamics Laboratory and the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion's Goddard Institute for Space Science, predict continental drying in 
middle latitudes. This means that parched soils, scorching droughts, and 
massive heat waves, like those that devastated crops in the Midwest in the 
summer of 1988, could become commonplace. Water levels in the Great 
Lakes could drop by a foot, interfering with navigation for ocean-going 
vessels. 26 Extreme temperatures have been shown to elevate human mortal-
ity. Some models also project perturbations of atmospheric and ocean circu-
lation patterns. The impact of these changes is highly unpredictable. 
Countries with tropical climates could experience especially severe conse-
quences. Semiarid areas, like much of sub-Saharan Africa, might suffer from 
even lower rainfall. Many semiarid areas are already marginal for agricul-
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ture, are highly sensitive to changes in climate, and have had severe droughts 
and famines for the last several decades. Tropical humid climates could 
become hotter and wetter, with an increase in the frequency and severity of 
tropical storms. Floods, which between 1968 and 1988 killed more than 
80,000 people and affected at least 200 million more, could worsen. Natural 
disasters such as floods, now unusual, could become increasingly common. 
While there is little disagreement over greenhouse theory, some contro-
versy-on occasion quite acrimonious-surrounds the question of whether 
the planet is already experiencing greenhouse-driven warming as measured 
against a background of natural temperature variability. A number of well-
respected experts assert that climate disruption caused by the greenhouse 
effect is already evident. They point to a trend in global temperatures, which 
in 1988 were at or near the record for the period of instrumental data. 
Moreover, the five warmest years in this century all occurred during the 
1980s, and the rate of global warming for the past two decades was higher 
than any in recorded history.17 Others, citing a still unexplained cooling 
trend earlier in the century, question the causal relationship between green-
house theory and elevated temperatures.28 
Occasionally the science of global warming is contrasted with that of 
stratospheric ozone depletion, which is said to be quite certain. However, it 
is interesting to note that for the better part of a decade, the policy debate 
over stratospheric ozone was dominated by a focus on precisely the sort of 
scientific uncertainties that now characterize the greenhouse issue. In any 
event, because there is a lag on the order of decades between emissions of 
greenhouse gases and their effects, the level of heat-absorbing chemicals 
already released into the atmosphere may have irrevocably committed the 
world to an additional increase of .9° to 2. 7°F over the next fifty years, even 
if the atmosphere's composition were stabilized today.29 
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
The greenhouse effect, if unchecked, is likely to cause unpredictable distur-
bances in the balance of power worldwide, exacerbating the risk of war. The 
projected climatic turmoil and its accompanying impacts are sufficiently 
dramatic in quality, magnitude, and rapidity that policymakers should give 
the most serious consideration to the security implications of the ongoing 
failure to anticipate and arrest greenhouse warming. The oil crises of the 
1970s, like the Persian Gulf crisis, were widely perceived as a national 
security issue because excessive dependence on foreign oil threatened the 
American economy. Prevention of global climate perturbation demands the 
immediate attention of the nation's leaders for the same reason. But so far. 
the implications of the greenhouse phenomenon have not played the slight-
est role in long-term strategic planning by the government. 
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The odds are strongly stacked against every country in the game of 
d1mate roulette. Contrary to some speculation, it is very unlikely that any 
region of the world will be a net "winner" from climate change. The very 
concept of "winning" implies the existence of a stable warmer climate, 
which will not occur unless the warming trend is halted. There is no natural 
endpoint to climate disruption from the greenhouse effect. Even the limited 
goal of a steady-state warmer climate will require major policy reform. 
Otherwise, greenhouse gas concentrations and global temperatures will con-
tinue to increase indefinitely, nullifying any short-term benefits. Moreover, 
no single country will be able to guarantee that the phenomenon is arrested 
at an optimal point for that country. The only way to ensure that there will 
be any winners is to guarantee that all countries are winners by reversing the 
global buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
Even if a stable warmer climate were identified as a policy goal, the rate of 
climate change resulting from greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere 
would be faster than ever experienced in human history. This climate alter-
ation would undoubtedly result in decades of destruction from an inability to 
alter human behavior, such as agricultural techniques, fast enough to take 
advantage of new weather patterns. The transition to warmer climates is 
expected to be turbulent, accompanied by an increase in the frequency, inten-
sity, duration, and geographic extent of extreme weather events like droughts 
and storms. Moreover, sea-level rise would be certain to entail net harm the 
world over. No region or individual country should place the health and well-
being of its public and environment at stake in what amounts to a crapshoot. 
While all countries are likely to be losers in the global climate gamble, 
some countries have more at stake than others. The United States has a 
particularly large investment in the status quo. Its current preeminence in 
world affairs ultimately derives from the strength of the nation's economy. 
The productivity of the country's natural resources, such as the incompara-
bly valuable farmland of the Midwest, was an essential prerequisite to Amer-
ica's economic well-being in the latter half of the twentieth century. Impend-
ing climate change means that this productivity can no longer be taken for 
granted. The greenhouse effect threatens the overall health of the American 
economy and could require a massive diversion of resources to nonproduc-
tive adaptive activities. 
The United States has one of the most productive agricultural sectors on 
earth, producing nearly 50 percent of the world's corn and nearly 60 percent 
of its soybeans. The United States is also the world's leading exporter of 
wheat and corn. Climate models, however, suggest that this pattern could 
change dramatically if the Midwest became 10 to 20 percent drier and crop 
yields were reduced.30 The drought of 1988 demonstrated that falling crop 
yields are a very real possibility. The difference between summer 1988's 
events and the effects of greenhouse-induced climate change would be that 
the latter is permanent and worsening, not just an isolated calamity. 
--
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Adapting to future climate change is also likely to require significant 
resources in the United States. Fighting the effects of a rising sea level on 
the heavily developed coasts of the United States, where about 75 percent 
of the population of the United States resides in 1990, will be phenome-
nally expensive. Maintaining threatened developments along American 
shorelines by diking cities, pumping sand, and building bulkheads and 
levees could cost $73 to $111 billion by 2100 for a three-foot rise.31 Seven 
of the ten most populous cities in the United States are located either on 
the coasts or on coastal estuaries that would be severely affected by sea-
level rise. 
The effects of greenhouse warming will also be felt in other parts of the 
world, creating disruptions of global scale with inevitable adverse impacts 
on the United States and its political and economic security. Loss of low-
lying territory could create refugee problems of an unprecedented scale. 
Inundation of just the tiny island country of the_ Maldives would require the 
relocation of nearly 200,000 people. Competition over territory and natural 
resources launched by those displaced by sea-level rise could create or exacer-
bate regional strife. Pressure from the 10 million individuals in Bangladesh 
who would be uprooted by a three-foot sea-level rise could heighten regional 
tensions. Famine created by greenhouse-driven crop failures could also gen-
erate regional clashes. Such an acceleration in regional showdowns could 
destabilize the world political balance in highly unpredictable ways, placing 
United States security interests at risk. 
In addition to these strategic considerations, the economic and social 
dislocations caused by global warming could undermine the development 
strategies of Third World countries, condemning hundreds of millions of 
people to decades more of poverty. Moreover, the pressure on Third World 
governments to deal with these disturbances would likely hinder their ability 
to formulate and implement policies to reduce further emissions of green-
house gases. This may be one of the most catastrophic "feedbacks" associ-
ated with global climate change. It underscores the need to pursue policies to 
mitigate the amount of warming sooner, rather than later. Waiting until the 
consequences of climatic change have been manifested will severely impair 
the efficacy of later policies implemented to slow the pace of climatic 
change. 
ARRESTING CLIMATE CHANGE 
The worst effects of a greenhouse-induced climate cataclysm can be averted. 
And the sooner action is taken, the more effective it will be. Conversely, the 
longer a policy response is delayed, the greater the warming that will have 
accumulated and the more radical the measures that will be required to 
prevent further climatic upheaval. 
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CFCs and halons are by far the easiest component of the greenhouse 
problem to eliminate. Besides their major contribution to the global warm-
ing phenomenon, these chemicals are also the principal culprits implicated in 
rhe destruction of stratospheric ozone. In contrast to other greenhouse gases, 
reductions in emissions of CFCs and halons are now required by the regula-
tor\' structures of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer 12 and the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone 
Layer. B Aside from representing a diplomatic milestone for international 
cooperation on protecting stratospheric ozone, the Montreal protocol-the 
more significant and prescriptive of the two multilateral treaties-is also an 
important precedent for a multilateral strategy on the more challenging issue 
of greenhouse warming. But despite the fact that these instruments help to 
address the global warming problem in an indirect, incremental manner, 
they are far from a comprehensive greenhouse gas regime. Indeed, the Mon-
treal protocol does not specify that alternatives to the CFCs and halons 
controlled by the government must or even should be greenhouse friendly. 
The Montreal Protocol, signed in September 1987, requires an incremen-
tal 50 percent reduction in the consumption of five ozone-depleting CFCs by 
the end of the century. Beginning in July 1989, consumption of these sub-
stances was to be frozen at 1986 levels. A reduction of 20 percent must be 
achieved beginning four years later, and an additional 30 percent beginning 
in July 1998. The agreement permits each country to implement these re-
quirements as it chooses through recycling, destruction, or abandonment of 
unnecessary uses of these chemicals. However, the overall strategy is to 
stimulate the development of alternatives to existing CFCs by constricting 
supply. The Montreal Protocol contains groundbreaking trade incentives for 
broad participation, including a ban on imports of controlled substances 
from countries that are not party to the accord. Its provisions dealing specifi-
cally with developing countries resolve delicate equity issues by allowing 
Third World countries a ten-year grace period to make required reductions. 
As of mid-1990, the obligations of this multilateral treaty were in force for 
fifty-seven countries. 
Despite the precedential importance of the Montreal Protocol, the reduc-
tion schedule in the agreement was recognized as inadequate even from the 
day of its signature. Moreover, soon afterwards a seasonal thinning of 50 
percent of the ozone layer over Antarctica-the ozone "hole" -was conclu-
sively connected to CFCs.34 Widely accepted scientific evidence documents 
that average global losses in stratospheric ozone of about 3 percent-two to 
three times that previously predicted by computer models-have already 
occurred. 35 Even if CFCs and halons are phased out within five to seven 
years, the long atmospheric lifetimes of these chemicals mean that the envi-
ronment could take up to a century to recover. Further, even if production of 
these dangerous chemicals were to be eliminated altogether, they would 
continue to seep out of the existing stock of refrigerators, air conditioners, 
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insulation, and other repositories. It is now clear that emissions of CFCs and 
halons must be virtually eliminated because of the overwhelming risks these 
chemicals pose to climate and stratospheric ozone. 
In light of these scientific findings, major initiatives have already been 
undertaken to strengthen the Montreal protocol and, through it, domestic 
control measures. The amended agreement requires a total phase-out by 
industrialized countries in consumption of CFCs, halons, and a related 
ozone-depleting chemical, carbon tetrachloride (CC1 4), before the end of 
the century. Consumption of another potent ozone depleter, methyl chloro-
form (CH3CCli), is to be completely terminated by 2005. Developing coun-
tries, as in the original agreement, will receive a grace period for making 
required reductions. The amended agreement also creates a multilateral 
fund of up to $240 million "for the purposes of providing financial and 
technical co-operation, including the transfer of technologies, to [develop-
ing countries]." 
To stabilize global concentrations of CO2, it will be necessary to cut 
global emissions of this gas by at least 60 percent.36 Particularly in the 
industrialized world, the burning of fossil fuels releases most of the excess 
CO2 in the atmosphere. Because no economical technology for removing 
CO2 from waste gas streams is now available, reducing releases of CO2 will 
require a lower total energy consumption and a shift in energy sources 
toward low- or non-CO2-emitting technologies. Greenhouse impacts should 
be an explicit part of all future decision-making processes in the energy 
sector. Reductions in fossil fuel use will also help to ease other environmen-
tal problems associated with current patterns of energy use, such as acid rain 
and local air pollution. 
Even with the most optimistic assumptions about economic growth, 
major reductions in CO2 emissions from industrialized countries can be 
achieved with energy conservation, efficiency technologies, and renewable 
energy sources. For example, the 1,200 kilowatt-hours per year used by a 
typical frost-free refrigerator can be reduced to only 180 with a state-of-the-
art model. Current technology can light an office building with an expendi-
ture of only .5 5 watts per square foot, as little as one-fifth of today's aver-
age. It is now possible to produce motor vehicles-which currently account 
for more than one-fourth of greenhouse gases released in the United States-
that have fuel economies of up to 98 miles per gallon, two to five times as 
efficient as those now on the road. 
Efficiency improvements have meant that the amount of energy used in 
the United States today is about the same as in 1973, despite a 40 percent 
increase in GNP during the same period. 37 Application of existing efficiency 
technologies could reduce United States CO2 emissions by 14 to 18 percent 
by the end of the century.38 In California alone, a steady improvement in 
efficiency of 3.4 percent per year was achieved between 1973 and 1985 with 
only mild encouragement from state and local governments through policy 
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measures to encourage conservation and efficiency. Through a strategy man-
dating or aggressively promoting efficiency improvements, national progress 
could be much faster. 
Nuclear energy has been proposed in some quarters as the preferred 
solution to the problem of greenhouse warming. Although atomic power is a 
CO2-free technology, its other risks currently make it the least attractive 
alternative to fossil fuels. Nuclear energy carries the inherent danger of 
weapons proliferation. The current generation of nuclear reactors still en-
tails the unacceptable danger of accidents and suffers from a critical lack of 
public confidence in an increasingly large number of countries. The problem 
of disposing of waste that will remain hazardously radioactive for many 
hundreds of thousands of years has yet to be adequately solved. Of the 
alternative strategies for reducing CO2 emissions, nuclear energy is among 
the most expensive. Moreover, to reduce CO2 emissions by 50 percent by the 
year 2020 solely through the expansion of the nuclear industry would re-
quire bringing a new plant on line somewhere in the world at the rate of 
almost one a day starting in the mid-1990s-clearly a practical impossibil-
ity. While the nuclear option may be worthy of consideration as part of the 
public debate on ultimate solutions to the greenhouse problem, increased 
reliance on nuclear power at present would be both politically unfeasible 
and irresponsible when major, cheap reductions in CO2 emissions are avail-
able with existing efficiency and conservation technologies. 
Reversing deforestation and creating new forested areas will help to 
offset current levels of CO2 emissions. New forests, in absorbing CO2 from 
the air during photosynthesis, will contribute to climate stabilization by 
serving as supplementary reservoirs for carbon. Aggressive policies to con-
serve existing forests and create new forested areas will yield other signifi-
cant environmental benefits, including erosion control and the preservation 
of a rich diversity of species whose genetic potential is only now becoming 
accessible to humankind. 
The fundamentals of the greenhouse phenomenon are now well under-
stood and the need for swift policy responses firmly established. But in the 
United States, as in every country, the intransigence of entrenched interest 
groups can create policy lethargy. Moreover, it may be difficult to muster a 
political constituency in support of subsidies for overseas transfers of 
greenhouse-friendly technologies and assistance to poorer countries for com-
bating the greenhouse phenomenon. But there are also likely to be substan-
tial opportunities for those astute businesses and considerable advantages 
for those farsighted countries that anticipate the need for policy responses 
sooner rather than later. 
While these responses are being implemented, the development and dis-
semination of technologies to combat climate disturbance-such as CFC-
free, energy-efficient refrigerators and low-methane strains of rice-should 
be a high priority. Increased basic research to resolve remaining uncertain-
394 / DAVID A. WIRTH 
ties concerning the magnitude, rate, and effects of greenhouse warming 
should also be undertaken. 
THE ROLE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
An equitable response to the special needs of developing countries is crucial 
to removing greenhouse threats to the global climate. On the one hand, 
developing countries have caused little of the problem, and industrialized 
countries must bear the bulk of the blame for past and current emissions. On 
the other hand, as economic development accelerates, Third World coun-
tries may account for the preponderance of greenhouse gas emissions by the 
middle of the next century. An international solution that provides incen-
tives for the participation of developing countries while fairly distributing 
the responsibility for implementing solutions is essential to a successful 
global strategy for combating greenhouse warming. 
The consequences of the greenhouse effect strongly suggest that it is in 
the self-interest of Third World countries to reexamine expeditiously their 
energy priorities. Developing countries, with fewer resources to adapt to 
environmental disturbances, stand to suffer disproportionately from a rapid 
climate change. For example, the productivity of common rice varieties falls 
off dramatically at temperatures just a few degrees higher than those cur-
rently prevailing in many rice-growing areas. 
Tapping the tremendous potential for conservation and improved end-use 
efficiency in the developing world would contribute to a solution for green-
house warming while meeting much of the Third World's growing energy 
needs.39 This strategy also avoids other serious environmental and social 
problems, such as land degradation, local air pollution, and population dis-
placement, that accompany the building of fossil-fuel-fired power installa-
tions. By the year 2020 it may be possible to achieve a universal standard of 
living far beyond that necessary to satisfy basic needs with little or no increase 
in global energy consumption from today's levels. However, many develop-
ing countries use energy in a highly inefficient manner. Macroeconomic 
policies in many developing countries, such as electricity price subsidies, 
discourage conservation and efficiency improvements. Firms in Brazil, where 
electricity prices are subsidized, have manufactured energy-efficient air condi-
tioners for export but cheap, inefficient models for domestic consumption. 
Investments in efficiency gains are extremely attractive from many points 
of view. They require less capital and less foreign exchange than do compara-
ble amounts of new power supply, contributing to overall economic produc-
tivity. Through efficiency and conservation, developing countries could avoid 
at least $1.4 trillion in power supply expansion costs between now and the 
year 2008.40 
Efficiency investments represent a major opportunity for donors like the 
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United States and the World Bank to assist developing countries in making en-
ergy choices that both avoid mistakes made earlier in the developed world and 
reduce risks to the entire planet from greenhouse warming. Unfortunately, 
much of current foreign aid directed to the environmentally sensitive energy 
sector often exacerbates the threat of greenhouse warming by emphasizing 
conventional energy sources, such as massive fossil-fuel-fired power plants. 
For instance, the World Bank, which controls an annual energy lending 
portfolio of roughly $4 billion, is one of the principal donors supporting 
power-generation projects in the Third World. Through measures such as 
pricing reforms and improvements in the operation of existing power plants 
and distribution systems, the bank has already made a commitment to 
encourage conservation and the efficient use of energy. There is, however, 
considerably more that the bank can do. 
The bank requires preparation of a "least cost" plan to precede invest-
ments in the energy sector. Current methodologies for these studies primar-
ily address strategies for increasing energy supply. Support for demand-
reduction measures, such as end-use efficiency improvements, which are 
often economically as well as environmentally superior to investments in 
supply, have not consistently been considered as alternatives to conventional 
power-generation projects in bank energy-sector strategies. Expanding the 
universe of alternatives to include demand-reduction options would simulta-
neously help developing countries reduce the rate of growth in their power-
generating capacity and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions without sacrificing 
the energy needed for economic development. Additional staff trained in 
strategies for encouraging end-use efficiency improvements would signifi-
cantly increase the bank's capabilities in this crucial area. 
Forest policy is another area where development assistance can provide 
benefits to Third World countries while simultaneously cutting emissions of 
greenhouse gases. While there has been great concern in North America and 
Western Europe about destruction of tropical forests, donor countries his-
torically have devoted little capital to conservation of this crucial resource 
and have earmarked even less for the creation of new forest areas. Case 
studies have documented that projects financed with little regard for the 
integrity of natural resources by donors such as the World Bank have seri-
ously exacerbated forest loss in key countries such as Brazil and Indonesia. 
Industrialized countries can also help to reverse tropical deforestation and 
encourage reforestation through changes in domestic policies. Developed 
countries provide the primary market for tropical hardwoods, virtually all 
of which are harvested at an unsustainable rate and in an unsustainable 
manner. Firms based in industrialized countries often reap the profits of this 
trade. Governments of industrialized countries should consider controlling 
trade in tropical woods and compensating exporting countries for lost reve-
nues through alternative investments. 
The Third World debt crisis may also present major opportunities for 
.. 
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encouraging better forest management in developing countries. As the mar-
ket value of such debt has fallen, a number of private banks have sold debt 
owed to them by Third World governments to private conservation organiza-
tions, which have then forgiven the debt in return for specific promises by 
the governments concerned, such as a commitment to conserve a particular 
area and to support its maintenance with a stream of payments in local 
currency. Such "debt for nature" swaps are already in place in Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, and Ecuador, and more are under negotiation. Governments of credi-
tor countries can adopt policies, such as tax incentives, that encourage 
private banks to sell debt for swaps. Then it may even be possible to inject 
environmental policy considerations, such as forest preservation or energy 
efficiency, into negotiations between debtor country governments and credi-
tor banks involving potentially massive amounts of debt. Creditor govern-
ments can also reduce interest or principal on sovereign debt in return for 
promises of policy reform in these critical sectors. 
CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL ACTION 
Coordinating policies on the international level to fight greenhouse warming 
will maximize environmental and foreign policy benefits. Unilateral reduc-
tions in releases of greenhouse gases by large emitters such as the United 
States and the Soviet Union will go a long way toward arresting global 
climate disruption. However, a multilateral consensus strategy will further 
the crucial goals of creating incentives for universal participation and estab-
lishing an equitable balancing of responsibility for solving the problem. 
These and other international political, legal, and institutional challenges 
are likely to endure over time, even as the science of the global warming 
issue evolves. 
Existing international mechanisms are an important part of such a strat-
egy. A reassessment of the Montreal Protocol, a process that is provided for 
by the document itself, is the most expeditious way to eliminate the contribu-
tions CFCs and halons make to the global warming problem. The World 
Bank's institutional structure includes mechanisms for member countries to 
redirect priorities in the critical energy and forest sectors. But existing mecha-
nisms by themselves are highly unlikely to be adequate for the task of 
crafting a comprehensive greenhouse gas regime. 
The remainder of the greenhouse problem could be handled most effec-
tively through a multilateral treaty, with standards binding under interna-
tional law that would require each country to take prescribed actions to 
reduce and halt greenhouse warming. An international agreement designed 
to arrest global climate change should satisfy several basic requirements. 
First, it must require reductions in releases of greenhouse gases of a magni-
tude and speed sufficient to stabilize the earth's climate. The most important 
Catastrophic Climate Change / 397 
gas to control is CO2, for which global reductions of at least 60 percent are 
necessary. Participating countries should accomplish these reductions by 
means of environmentally and economically sound technologies that do not 
present unacceptable risks to public health or world security. The creation of 
new forested areas might be encouraged by allowing credits against reduc-
tions of CO2 emissions that would otherwise be required and by provisions 
establishing or promoting forestry programs. Because the agreement could 
be expected to cover a large number of emissions sources, it should require 
strict mechanisms for enforcement through reporting of emissions, on-site 
audits, and internationally controlled remote sensing. 
Second, the responsibility for making reductions must be distributed 
equitably. Among the criteria that could be applied is relative national 
wealth as measured by per capita GNP. Another test could be per capita 
emissions of CO2, with the highest reductions required of those countries 
with the highest emissions per unit of population. Another possibility would 
be to require the imposition of a fee for carbon emissions, either as a 
primary mechanism for achieving reductions or as a supplementary measure 
to generate revenue. Any of these formulas would require proportionally 
greater cutbacks by the wealthiest countries and leave the poorest countries 
with the fewest constraints on CO2 emissions. 
A treaty should also require a commitment from wealthier countries for 
increased research into non-CO2 energy supply technologies and develop-
ment assistance to help poorer countries meet the requirements accepted by 
them in the agreement. One mechanism for generating the necessary capital 
is to require countries to contribute to a fund in proportion to their CO2 
emissions. The resources of the fund, which could be financed by a carbon 
fee, could be used to fund forest protection and reforestation programs, as 
well as to develop and disseminate energy efficiency and conservation tech-
nologies and environmentally benign renewable energy sources. Restricting 
access to this fund to those countries that accepted the obligations of the 
treaty would create incentives for broad participation. 
The first step toward international negotiations on a global climate treaty 
was taken with the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), which met for the first time in November 1988. The IPCC 
was created under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization with a mandate to 
study the climate change issue and report to the Second World Climate 
Conference in the fall of 1990. More than thirty-five countries participate in 
IPCC activities, which are distributed among three "working groups": a 
science working group; a working group studying social and environmental 
impacts of climate change; and a Response Strategies Working Group 
(RSWG). The RSWG, beginning with its meeting in Geneva in October 1989, 
has begun to examine possible elements for inclusion in a framework con-
vention on climate change. Although the original scope of the IPCC's activi-
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ties did not include preparation for the adoption of a formal treaty, a number 
of recent directives clearly authorize the negotiation of a greenhouse-gas 
convention. These include the final statement of an international meeting 
hosted by the government of Canada in 1988,41 the declaration of an interna-
tional meeting sponsored by the government of the Netherlands in March 
1989,42 a decision of the UNEP governing council taken at its May 1989 
meeting,43 the communiques of the Group of Seven industrialized countries 
from their 1989 and 1990 gatherings, 44 the declaration of a ministerial confer-
ence on pollution and climate change hosted by the Dutch government in 
November 1989,45 and the final statement of a ministerial conference spon-
sored by the government of Norway in May 1990.46 
Optimism about the prospects for a treaty to limit emissions of green-
house gases through a global convention arises to a great extent from prog-
ress on CFCs and halons in the Montreal Protocol. However, most of the 
existing mandates for the negotiation of a global warming treaty consciously 
limit action to a "framework" or "umbrella" instrument analogous not to 
the 1987 Montreal Protocol, but to the 1985 Vienna convention. Unfortu-
nately, this precursor to the Montreal Protocol establishes only a structure 
for cooperation in research and exchange of information. It does not man-
date reductions in emissions of CFCs or halons, nor does it require any other 
measures that directly benefit the environment. 
There is a serious risk that precious time will be lost in protracted 
negotiation over these "framework" functions, which in any event have 
already been largely performed by the IPCC process. Instead, a greenhouse-
gas convention should contain minimum global goals commensurate with 
environmental necessity, such as a commitment to reduce global emissions 
of CO2 by at least 60 percent on a specified timetable. The implementation 
of these goals could be taken up in negotiations on ancillary agreements 
similar to the Montreal Protocol, when complicated issues such as the distri-
bution of national obligations for reductions could be addressed. 
Industrialized countries, and in particular the United States, must take the 
lead in identifying global solutions to this global problem. Developed nations 
are primarily responsible for past and current threats to the global climate, 
and these are the countries with the resources to combat it. If the industrial-
ized world does not seize a leadership role, there is scant likelihood that other, 
far poorer countries can be convinced either of the seriousness of the problem 
or of the necessity to mobilize the political will efficaciously to respond. 
As of mid-1990, debate on the greenhouse issue, both internationally 
and domestically within the United States, fails this test. The most ambitious 
policies currently under serious international consideration would merely 
level off emissions of CO2 by the end of this century or the beginning of the 
next. The United States, citing scientific uncertainty, has rejected even this 
modest goal. Moreover, the United States and others have resisted simulta-
neous negotiation of the "framework" convention and protocols, raising the 
possibility of an endlessly protracted procedure for the adoption of a multi-
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laterally agreed strategy. Faced with international gridlock, some countries, 
such as the Federal Republic of Germany, have chosen to act on a unilateral 
basis, and others, such as eighteen European nations, have opted for coordi-
nated regional measures. Some states of the United States, such as Connecti-
cut, New York, and Vermont have taken an analogous approach, in part to 
prod inertial federal policies.47 
Considering the importance of the resources at risk, it would be nothing 
short of reckless to continue with business as usual. A failure to respond to 
the threat of greenhouse warming would amount to an affirmative decision 
to wager the health and well-being of current and future generations against 
overwhelming odds. 
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